Entrepreneurial sons, patriarchy and the Colonels' experiment in Thessaly, rural Greece by Bika, Zografia
This article was downloaded by: [University of East Anglia Library]
On: 30 April 2012, At: 03:34
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Entrepreneurship & Regional
Development: An International Journal
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tepn20
Entrepreneurial sons, patriarchy and
the Colonels’ experiment in Thessaly,
rural Greece
Zografia Bika a
a Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4
7TJ, UK
Available online: 30 Apr 2012
To cite this article: Zografia Bika (2012): Entrepreneurial sons, patriarchy and the Colonels’
experiment in Thessaly, rural Greece, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development: An International
Journal, 24:3-4, 235-257
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08985626.2012.670915
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development
Vol. 24, Nos. 3–4, April 2012, 235–257
Entrepreneurial sons, patriarchy and the Colonels’ experiment in
Thessaly, rural Greece
Zografia Bika*
Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
Existing studies within the field of institutional entrepreneurship explore
how entrepreneurs influence change in economic institutions. This paper
turns the attention of scholarly inquiry on the antecedents of deinstitu-
tionalization and more specifically, the influence of entrepreneurship in
shaping social institutions such as patriarchy. The paper draws from the
findings of ethnographic work in two Greek lowland village communities
during the military Dictatorship (1967–1974). Paradoxically this era
associated with the spread of mechanization, cheap credit, revaluation of
labour and clear means-ends relations, signalled entrepreneurial sons’
individuated dissent and activism who were now able to question the
Patriarch’s authority, recognize opportunities and act as unintentional
agents of deinstitutionalization. A ‘different’ model of institutional change
is presented here, where politics intersects with entrepreneurs, in changing
social institutions. This model discusses the external drivers of institutional
atrophy and how handling dissensus (and its varieties over historical time)
is instrumental in enabling institutional entrepreneurship.
Keywords: institutional entrepreneurship; patriarchy; family farming;
peripherality; rural change
1. Introduction
Can entrepreneurs change social institutions? The question cannot be answered from
the available institutional entrepreneurship literature that has so far concentrated
on how individual or organizational action influences economic institutions such as
industries (Leblebici et al. 1991; Holm 1995; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Lounsbury
2007), professions (DiMaggio 1991; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002;
Townley 2002) or markets (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Ahmadjian and
Robinson 2001; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005). It was Eisenstadt (1980, 851) who
first spoke about institutional entrepreneurs as being those actors that ‘serve to
connect different types of rebellion and combine changes in different institutional
spheres’ and thus become a stimulus for institutional change. Such institutional
entrepreneurs are not viewed here as brokers or islands of exchange but rather as
actors historically embedded in ongoing social relations and a continuous social world
(Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997; Jack and Anderson 2002; Kalantaridis and Bika 2006;
Bika 2007, 2011). To this extent, their enterprising is strongly affected by the need
(opportunity) to solve normative disagreements (politics) and yet itself affects practice
selection (institutions) in the social world in which these actors are embedded. Such
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opportunities are seen as being more enacted than discovered (Baker and Nelson
2005).
The research aim here is to show why and under what circumstances judgemental
gains or losses are precipitated, versatility of response is created and possibilities for
actors to engage in practice selection and to influence the process of institutional
change are opened up. The claim is that it is possible to distil from a rural
ethnographic study in Greece, the southern periphery of Europe a different model of
institutional change, which is summarized in Figure 1. To this extent, this empirical
study is particularly concerned with how entrepreneurship is enacted by totalitarian
politics and its accompanying regulatory influences to produce institutional atrophy
or non-isormophic change in a social institution such as patriarchy. Greenwood,
Suddaby, and Hinings’s (2002, 74) earlier assertion that highly articulated arenas of
social construction (such as dictatorship and its mandatory character are) ‘‘may
make change easier to achieve despite the highly institutionalized setting’’ appears to
be applicable here.
Extant literature on institutional entrepreneurship focuses more on how it works
and with what effects or in other words the manner in which interested actors
influence their institutional contexts (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002;
Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004;
Munir and Phillips 2005; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). Significantly, this
literature has ignored what sets institutional entrepreneurship in motion and what
activates it, resulting in ‘more’ or ‘less’ powerful, embedded and stratified actors
being both interested and situated in dominant subject positions of institutional
entrepreneurship. This former literature primarily pays attention to how serious
dissent has been avoided or neutralized by institutional entrepreneurs rather than
how dissent itself (and its varieties) was instrumental in establishing the dominant
subject position of institutional entrepreneurs. Such literature is more concerned
with the right hand side of Figure 1 portraying endogenous process models of
institutional change rather than discussing its external drivers. This study aims to
rectify this omission by shedding light on the links between the notion of dissensus
and judgemental decision making (and by implication entrepreneurship).
Practice
Selection 
Judgemental 
gains 
Threshold 
Dissensus 
POLITICS
Figure 1. Politics as an external driver of non-isomorphic institutional change via
entrepreneurship.
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The paper is organized as follows. The first section explores the key role of
dissensus in understanding entrepreneurial judgement. Methodological consider-
ations in the collection of the paper’s oral history data are discussed in a separate
section. The main body of empirical evidence is presented in the following two
sections covering different historical periods. Finally, an institutional theory
discussion and conclusions are offered regarding the ways politics (as an external
driver) intersects with entrepreneurs in changing social institutions.
2. Dissensus and entrepreneurial judgement
A key element in this paper’s understanding of entrepreneurship is concerned with
the demand-side perspective on how surrounding context and environmental factors
influence the number of problems requiring judgement and thus the need for
entrepreneurs. Casson’s (1982) definition of entrepreneurship as the process of
making judgemental decisions1 about the coordination of scarce resources begs the
question of what constitutes judgemental gain. Anthropological evidence from the
example of rural Greece is applied here to illustrate how such judgemental gain
results from handling dissensus rather than a vague notion of uncertainty that is
born by the entrepreneur in return for profit as it is suggested in classical
entrepreneurship theory (Cantillon 1755; Knight 1921; Harper 1996). Dissensus
elevates entrepreneurs to a position that structurally enables them to recognize
opportunities and act as institutional agents as well. Such conceptualisation moves
the theoretical emphasis from the rational elements in entrepreneurial action to its
transformative powers and most importantly, pays attention to temporality and thus
the different historical conditions that underpin entrepreneurial action.
The notion of dissensus has previously been employed in business studies of top
management teams to explore its positive contribution to organizational perfor-
mance in new ventures (West and Meyer 1998) and in political studies of elite-mass
relations to assess its constraining influence on European integration (Hooghe and
Marks 2008). Dissensus is defined as disagreement over issues of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
action or in other words disagreement over choice rather than truth (Kock 2007).
Disagreement about what is valuable represents the conditions that allow social
actors to create new resources of value and engage in new practice selection.
Dissensus has been selected as a tool of thought on the grounds of its dual capacity
to leave behind the conceptualisation of the state-as-the-external ‘other’, whilst at the
same time explores practical politics and cedes ‘voice’ at the rural grassroots and
their evaluative judgements on an obligatory rule. Dissensus is used here to analyse
in-depth how political conditioning delineates the varieties of available choices but
also to embrace the fuzziness of the distinction between micro- and macro-level
interpretation (Sayer 2000, 2001).
As Swedberg (2000, 37) argues, ‘successful entrepreneurship usually involves
more actors than the entrepreneur himself or herself’ such as the state, parents and a
variety of civil society organizations. If entrepreneurship is conceptualized as an
economic rent (excess payment) on dissensus, then institutional entrepreneurs
emerge as being those agents who respond to normative challenges that might exist in
a community and use their individual judgement to ‘re-socialize’ themselves and
others and in this way, they strategically reconstruct conventions. The incidence of
institutional entrepreneurship itself (especially in instances when entrepreneurs
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influence social institutions) is dependent on such a dissensus (see Figure 1).
As Biggart and Beamish (2003, 444) explain ‘conventions are shared templates for
interpreting situations and planning courses of action in mutually comprehensible
ways that involve social accountability, that is, they provide a basis for judging the
appropriateness of acts by self and other’. If judgement becomes individuated as a
result of external reasons, then conventions themselves follow suit. Following
Thompson’s (1967, 96) view, entrepreneurs are understood here as being those agents
who wind the clock-like mechanism of belief up (such as time, patriarchy and
citizenship) and consequently shape social institutions.
Rossi and Berk (1985) discuss varieties of normative dissensus in social systems
that have also been applied to organizational research (West and Meyer 1998). They
distinguish between three forms of dissent: threshold dissensus, a condition in which
persons differ in their intensities of adherence to norms and there are inter-individual
differences in judgement with little or much room for error being left to individuals’
judgement; segmented dissensus, in which persons differ in the norms to which they
subscribe and there are social group differences in judgement and individuals with
‘different degrees of influence between levels of authority’ in West and Meyer’s
words (1998, 400); domain dissensus, a condition in which individuation in norms
applies and there are emphasis differences on the fundamentality of issues. Rossi and
Berk’s three varieties of normative dissensus are used in this paper to delineate the
nature of dissensus that led to the deinstitutionalization of patriarchal rule. In this
fashion, the following configurations of dissent are distinguished: collective (or
individuated) dissent configurations are those characterized respectively by moderate
(or high) threshold differences among their individual members’ belief in author-
itative judgement; totalitarian (or grassroots) dissent configurations are those
characterized respectively by correlation with little (or widespread) segment
influence; personalized (or bureaucratic) dissent configurations are those character-
ized respectively by high (or moderate) emphasis differences on procedural norms in
the domain.
As a general principle, it is argued here that threshold dissensus differences define
entrepreneurial opportunity and pave the way for the slow erosion of social
institutions, whilst both segmented and domain dissensus differences are respectively
structural indices of fragmentation or heterogeneity. To this extent, entrepreneurs
emerge as productive or unproductive rent-seekers (Baumol 1990) dependent on
society’s pay offs to dissensus. It is now important to illustrate in what ways
dissensus has emerged in the case study and in particular, its various participants’
oral history accounts of institutional change.
3. Using an oral history methodology
The case study constructed here derives its ethnographic research findings from two
main villages in Thessaly, an advanced agricultural region located in the middle of
continental Greece in a low plain surrounded by high mountains. The two village
communities, Kotsari and Zobas, resemble each other markedly in their relatively
affluent cotton producing economy, their natural resources, the accessibility of their
location (35 km from the chief town) and their demographic conditions (1500
inhabitants). The only difference is in their cultural characteristics as they draw their
origins from different ethnic groups. Kotsari is a long-established village inhabited
238 Z. Bika
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
as
t A
ng
lia
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:3
5 3
0 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
by native Karagounis, whilst Zobas’ first dwellers were ethnic Greeks of Eastern
Rumelia (Bulgaria) who had arrived as refugees in 1924, when a voluntary
population exchange took place. Most importantly, it should be noted that all farm
families under investigation here started on an equal footing as a result of Thessaly’s
land tenure history (Triantafillidis 1906; Tsopotos 1912; Arseniou 1994). In the days
of land reform (late 1920s), Zobas’s family units were allotted 6.9 ha expropriated
land of relatively poor quality, whilst Kotsari received only 4.5 ha of arable land per
family unit by virtue of higher population density and better opportunities for
irrigation. Half a century later highly differentiated property groups2 were found to
accurately portray the variations between the size of the interviewees’ landholdings.
An end result of convergence between the two villages would be embodied in their
economic transition from wheat to cotton monoculture in the decades to come,
whereas cultural resistance would be mainly registered in the refugee community
where a slightly slower rhythm of change was witnessed.
3.1. Participant observation
The findings of this paper are based on a year’s participant observation as a
researcher in 1997 and the reworking of the collected oral history data under the
fresh influence of the literature around the concept of institutional entrepreneurship.
It is considered pertinent to use robust qualitative data collected more than a decade
ago to capture institutional change through historical time and thus respond to key
issues identified in the relevant bourgeoning literature. Yet, participant observation
remains the backbone of this primary data because it gave ‘an idea of interaction and
the interrelationships of social relations’ in a changing village society, and the ‘sense
of process’ that one could not get in any other way, as Frankenberg also argues (In
Burgess 1982, 52).
Participant observation also enabled the researcher to shift focus as interesting
new data became available in the course of her taking ‘a particular role within a
village culture’ and thus ‘examining at first hand a social situation from a
participant’s point of view’ (Burgess 1984, 98). To this extent, the researcher ‘hung
around’, made friends and thus came to understand what is socially regulated and
meaningful, ‘what does it take to ‘‘be somebody’’ in this world’ beyond the obvious
material warrants (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, 23). Participant observation helped
the oral history interviewing process ‘to begin, not altogether with the words of
people, but with a pre-examination of what they have built around themselves
physically and to what purposes’ as Hunter (1993, 39) explains in his notes on the
ethnography of local community elites.
As a participant observer, the researcher witnessed the significant absentees, or
‘networks of interaction and the deference and demeanour displayed’ in a public
setting which was used as background to prepare her for more-informed oral history
interviews (Hunter 1993, 47, 51). ‘Learning the local culture required attention to
vocabulary and absorption in the milieu’, so ‘hearing what people said (e.g. during
the interview) was often less important than observing what they did’ (Hunter 1993,
49). Such insight was obtained by being exposed to both the formal and informal
social relationships among villagers via participant observation. A parallel attempt
was made to develop some key informants, mostly her different landlords and other
village notables, and to spend sufficient time with them as a way of identifying
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recurring patterns and distinguishing between myth, reality and elliptical accounts
from the side of the interviewees. To this effect, the researcher observed people,
events and interaction, which helped her to give precision to the data, combine rival
accounts and work personal stories together in order to explore patterns of
institutional change and how such changes were constructed.
3.2. Sampling and data analysis
The study’s primary material includes 60 oral history interviews (equally split between
the two villages), unstructured, open-ended and in-depth, and archival work on the
minutes of their Community Councils since 1950. The interviewer used a list of topics
on which the respondent3 could talk and the whole process corresponded to the
conversational procedures of village life that were learned during participant
observation. Its object was to find out what kinds of changes have happened over
time and then to analyse how these historical changes were constructed and configured
within such narratives. Overall, less than half of the sample was interviewed on a one-
to-one basis (25 individual interviews), 6 were group interviews in public places, whilst
the rest was made up of conversations in home situations with more than one family
member participating (29 family interviews). Snowball sampling was employed, which
involved using key informants to identify households typical of a differentiated
community membership. A number of variables were noted so that each oral history
respondent was accurately placed in the economic setting (labour status, occupation,
access to land – i.e. land ownership and land rent) and their partial account adequately
assessed as being from a different status situation (gender, clan, neighbourhood,
generation, education, leadership and partnership scheme). The interviewees were
allowed to talk at length, and in their own terms. The interviewing process normally
lasted 2–3 hours, whilst tape recording was used for 1–1.5 hours in each case.
On returning from the fieldwork, the data was marked out in three time-frames
(post-war, military dictatorship and EU membership), whilst uniformities or
irregularities were picked up and summarised. The data-source triangulation
involved the horizontal and vertical comparison of tape transcriptions, field journal
notes and the minutes of the councils between, within and throughout the post-war
history of the two research communities. The criterion of principality in terms of
family farm decision making (rather than gender) alongside a research emphasis on
generational elements and how the story telling unfolds were employed in both the
sampling and data analysis. As Stanley and Wise (1990, 44) explain ‘in investigating
the textually mediated, institutionally located social relations of ruling, there is no
way in which a focus on men can be excluded’. No attempts are made in this paper to
renounce the regularities of the Greek rural world because they remained
androcentric and applied old redundant peripheral values to masculinity and
fatherhood.
4. Early post-war patriarchal order and consensual leadership (1950–1966)
The slow but continuous decline of patriarchs as socially knowledgeable actors
(of habitual knowledge and customary economic conventions/values) and agents of
logics reproduction has failed to come to surface in a recent body of Western
European rural literature (Oldrup 1999; Brandth 2002; Shortall 2002; Bennett 2004;
240 Z. Bika
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2006; Price and Evans 2006). Greek rural studies (Stratigaki 1988; Gourdomichalis
1991; Gidarakou 1999; Kalantaridis and Labrianidis 1999; Kazakopoulos and
Gidarakou 2003) have also paid little attention to the patterns of change in
historically-embedded patriarchal conventions and the fluctuation in the
bargaining power of the social actors involved. In the Greek rural context,
patriarchy became central in applying theoretical concepts such as the ‘domestic
mode of production’4 and its endless possibilities of cheap adjustment to
capitalism (Psychogios 1982, 1985). However, the findings of all these rural
studies did not challenge the status quo in general theories of patriarchy, where
it is mostly conceptualized as either an ahistorical universal (Feminist analysis),
a derivative from capitalism (Marxist analysis) or articulated with capitalism at
an abstract level (Walby 1989, 1990), but most importantly as being exclusive of
a generational element. To this extent, patriarchal conventions have been
condemned unequivocally, as if their historically contingent habits of thought
characterized only one spiteful social group, judgement or system.
Rethinking, however, the iron discipline of the early modern patriarchal family
through an institutional lens puts the analytical focus on its ability to legitimate its
benevolent purpose by functioning as an effective bulwark in times of troubled
economic matters. The Weberian usage of patriarchy (1947) as a system of control in
which fathers rule through their legitimate position as the head of household is
adopted here. In this conceptual framework the early post-war Thessalian reality
remained simple: land was constantly flooded and the most valuable asset of flocks
could easily be wiped out (‘sheep could get sick and simply die’), whilst the only
certainty came from family labour. Consequently, this consciousness fostered a
patriarchal society built upon consensus and the crucial question of ‘how many sons
does one have?’ In this milieu of kin-group authoritarianism, open friendship was
discouraged, while blood-clan solidarity and team work was the order of the day.
The division of family labour was decided the day before by the patriarch and was
accepted by everyone without any thought of objection (Petros Koutsomitis,
ex-village president and flourmill owner in Zobas). Roles and responsibilities of the
members were ascribed and strictly defined, the patriarch dealt peremptorily with
any cases of misbehaviour or deviation, whilst the use of a non-mechanical plough
restrained unequivocally the division of labour between sexes. Inter-individual
differences in judgement were kept defacto to a minimum.
‘We lived as an extended family (12–13 members: two married brothers, one single
brother and grandparents. Our whole house consisted of 3 rooms and one hall. The
members of my family quarrelled only behind each other’s backs, never in the open,
because the patriarch was very tough and prickly. He, my grandfather, was very tough
even on himself, he was very hard-working’ (Andreas Mauridis, private agronomist and
owner of 15 ha)
In a traditional society of ascription rather than achievement, the new faces had
less authority than the accustomed, the young obeyed their elders because of
so-called ‘respect’, whilst extended family members submitted to the will of the
patriarch and acknowledged dutifully the gendered legitimacy of unequal shares of
food, authority, and entertainment. As Aris Skarlos, Kotsari’s ex-village president
and owner of 5 ha described: ‘the best portions were for men. . . Men and women did
not sit to eat together at the same table. Women spent their time serving and ate what
was left over’.
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The early post-war patriarch’s authority was, however, perceived as benevolent,
because his power was based on an awareness of the life cycle. He was always right in
a village where life repeated itself, generation after generation. His decision making
was beyond doubt in a world that lacked education. Any potential sceptics were not
in a position to question his authority, because the patriarch’s power was
consolidated by his holding of the purse strings, and so in charge of any available
patronage in the family. The fear of family exclusion, i.e. the ‘black sheep’, pictured
the main threat against individuated dissent. In any case, the patriarch’s authority
was welcomed because of the consoling assurances and the economy of effort that it
brought to a world of hardship. Consequently, gerontocratic polity prevailed as long
as experience held the key to survival and therefore employed to its best advantage
this ‘time-honoured’ predictability and a routine model of action (as opposed to
strategic) (Dorado 2005). As Christos Katsaganis, an owner of 10 ha in Zobas,
explained:
‘I was an orphan. My father died in 1945. We were 4 brothers and one sister and I was
the eldest brother. I became a construction worker because I happened to attend a
technical school in 1954, which was situated in our village after the earthquake. My
grandfather attracted our respect and he was in charge of our household and the family
accounts until he died at the age of 85. He never made mistakes, because he was aware of
life. He was able to look after us. Until 1968, I gave all the money that I earned as a
construction worker, to him. I was 28 years old then. I was not forced to do so, but did
it out of respect’
In this period the patriarch’s authority could not subside as long as he proved to
be assured of quotidian political and economic process. The patriarchal household
economy and its obligatory co-habitation was mostly consensual and tended to
reduce the impact of family disputes and to deprive them of any long-term strength.
Younger male or female members of the extended family might have hated the
patriarch, but no one could contemplate breaking away or to taking the risk of living
by their own means. Family members had ‘interests’ even at this early phase of
institutional development but one could only apply discretion rather than strategic
agency in such uncertain environments (Beckert 1999).
‘Leaders held the purse strings and were the patriarchs. The patriarchal family life was
necessary, because there were not enough houses, so ‘living together’ was
compulsory. The sisters-in-law did not like each other, so the eldest one thought
about taking her husband and leaving. Then the patriarch intervened: ‘wait until I
sell the maize and I will buy you some timber so you can build a new hut next to
ours. Finally they contemplated: ‘why is it us that must leave the paternal
house? Maybe next year’’ (Aris Skarlos, ex-village president and owner of 5 ha in
Kotsari)
So the only thing that could be discerned in the village society were status groups
differentiated mainly by the persona of their patriarchal leaders, their competence
and determination to work hard. The patriarchal power in the village was not
structured as a pyramid. As Stavros Vasiloudis, carpenter and owner of 12 ha in
Zobas, remembers:
‘In 1957, I finished primary school and took my brother’s position in grazing our sheep.
My brother was 20 years old then, so he went into Vraona and became apprentice to a
carpenter. He stayed there two years and his skills became a great benefit to all of us.
Since 1968, we have had a carpenter’s workshop. My brother stayed in the shop, while I
dealt with the farm work. We had one money pot. My father sold our sheep in 1959–60,
242 Z. Bika
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because he wanted to buy some land (1.5 ha). Until 1980, all the land that we bought
was in my father’s name’
Unsurprisingly of course was the complete inability and lack of willingness on the
part of farm women to openly intervene in cases of family disputes which were
traditionally deemed to be part of the male domain. Nor were they at the front of the
developments opposing the rigidity of patriarchal rule. Greek women acquired the
right to vote in 1952, whilst all legal differentiation by gender became unconstitu-
tional only in 1975 (full implementation in 1983). In any case, farm family rifts
caused by filial rebellion and dissent had dire consequences for the powerless, as the
following case reveals.
‘In 1962, I fell out with my father. I had carried 50 carts of stones in order to build a
barn. I asked my father for 1500 Drs. in order to finish construction. He refused because
he said that I did not ask for his permission before I started building. I was 27 years old
then. I stopped speaking to my father for one month. I said to my mother: ‘Why didn’t
you say to my father to give me 1500 Drs.?’ Her answer was that she was not allowed to
do so and then started singing. Then my wife and I went to the new house allocated to
me for free after the earthquake. Since then, I started working as a day worker during
the harvest, I irrigated the fields of a large landowner. We did not even have spoons,
then Karouzos gave me 4 spoons, but I paid him back later on. There was no floor or
windows in this house. I accepted one sack of flour from my father-in-law. My father
gave me nothing’ (Panos Sfakianidis, owner of 5.2 ha in Zobas)
Segmented dissensus and its manifestations as clan sectarianism and hatred was
what happened to all those who found themselves embraced by a patriarchy in which
only deference could flourish. A person’s social standing determined his moral rights
and duties as a villager. The position of certain affairs was not evaluated according
to its pros and cons, but it was regulated normatively by strict rules. There was a
brutality in people’s actions that reflected the brutality in the fields. The patriarchal
tale to explore and exploit the human need for commitment, to give back to the
extended families from where villagers come, often gave rise to visceral reaction
rather than conscious reasoning. There was little room for individuated dissent.
‘Then things were different. If a member of your clan or extended family quarrelled with
somebody, your relatives would intervene and support you against them, it was a kind
of solidarity: even if you were wrong, and thus the evil was built up. We had vendettas.
The villages were divided into different parts with the upper quarters of the village
superior to the low ones. This was a heritage from past times’ (Tasos Trixopoulos,
owner of 5 ha in Kotsari)
The ethos of sheltered living in clans dictated blind loyalty and a series of
counter-revenges. Different village quarters represented different clans, different
neighbourhoods and consequently different social statuses. Disputes among rivals
living side by side were inevitable when an ethos of variable and discriminatory
consideration was experienced as a daily routine. The capitalist tide may have ebbed
quietly at the edge of the early post-war village but the full force of its flow was yet to
make the impact of transition in lowland rural Thessaly.
5. Entrepreneurship and the impact of the Colonels’ experiment on patriarchy
5.1. Enforced depoliticization
The Colonels (1967–1974) were not ideologically in favour of powerful patriarchs,
comprising a Greek peasant bourgeoisie because they subscribed to the schematic
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 243
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
as
t A
ng
lia
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:3
5 3
0 A
pr
il 2
01
2 
notions of populist corporatism and an undifferentiated ‘people’. ‘Among their
initially popular measures were decrees fixing prices, increasing pensions, re-
distributing land, and compelling government departments to deal with all
complaints within two days’ (Woodhouse 1991, 290). To this extent, the Colonels
were extremely successful in depoliticizing the rural mass and in buying off any
potential protest (An Economic Observer 1972, 35). Their popularity was quite
remarkable. Until the 1960s, the rural sector had been treated harshly, an industrial
reserve army of labour and a source of cheap food. The Greek peasantry was kept in
subservience by way of insecurity which supported the continuation of the
patriarchal rule and the ‘otherness’ of Southern European peripherality. During
the Dictatorship, however, this prolonged destitution was ameliorated but also
mediated by a more intense political coercion against any social group differences in
judgement, a matter more of image than of substance as perceived by the Thessalian
peasantry.
‘The Dictatorship was a milestone in the life of villagers. If I called you a communist
and you reported it, I would go to prison. We were living in harmony, this period made
us think about nothing but football. We did not care or talk about politics because we
were having a good time financially, we were not afraid, we just forgot about everything
else’ (Apostolos Loukopoulos, owner of 10.7 ha in Kotsari)
During the Dictatorship the political world as a whole suffered from a ‘one body’
totalitarian system. The Colonels removed the focus of any legitimate struggle from
‘the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring’ for the benefits of patronage among eminent
patriarchal families dependent on the state for their consolidation, towards the
realization of a nation as a purportedly single-interest group. The horizontal links of
community life no longer enjoyed the space to develop towards either consensus or
conflict, and village practices such as mitzia (i.e. a cry for help for labour) and other
collective customs presupposed by a kind of local grouping went into decline. Any
fellowship of interests other than patriotic was prohibited, whilst private gatherings
of more than five persons were forbidden. As Orestis Bastas, owner of 10 ha in
Kotsari explains: ‘The police could come and ask you to dance in the national fiestas
regardless of your political beliefs. We had to stay outside and clap our hands. They
were watching you’. Measures were also taken to eliminate parochial distinction and
peripheral traditions with this dirigiste culturalism having particular importance and
impact in Zobas:
‘The Dictatorship ruled that some things were foreign and that it would be for the better
to prohibit some of our folklore customs, which they characterized as Bulgarian. They
thought that if Zobas’ dances continued as they were, a Bulgarian pocket of dissent
would remain in Greece’ (Themis Tsantilidis, owner of 3 ha in Zobas)
During the Dictatorship ‘there was no political factionalism, politics went to bed,
it fell into oblivion’ (Thanasis Karouzos, electrician and owner of 45 ha in Zobas)
and this time operated as a period of amnesia. The Colonels wanted ‘an apathetic
brotherhood’ for all Greeks, which could help sustain their time in power. However,
it was difficult for the villagers to stand on such a general platform, when everyone
was put under a different political identity. The old communist and anti-communism
schism inherited from the civil war period (1946–1949) was ready to be eradicated.5
‘When the Colonels came into power the slogans were: ‘‘Greece of the Christian
Greeks’’, ‘‘all people are equal’’, ‘‘work if you want to earn your living’’, ‘‘the bank
will give credit to everybody irrespective of political ideology’’’ (Thanasis Karouzos,
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electrician and owner of 45 ha in Zobas). ‘In contrast to most of the previous
instances of praetorianism, the Colonels did not intervene on behalf of any given
parataxis or political family, only to withdraw from the political arena once their
favoured political clients had been established in office’ (Clogg 1992, 164). The
Colonels’ contempt for professional politicians was escorted hand-in-hand by a
renewed establishment where bribes were found to be unnecessary (Woodhouse
1991, 291). The Colonels tried to build a ‘no-party’ state, where the civil right to
express an opinion was not allowed, and with villagers able only to join and work
hard, but not to engage in group or issue judgements (and fights). In the peasant’s
eye view the village was no longer separated into beneficiaries and victims of the civil
war legacy or in other words, into ‘sides’ that previously formed segmented
dissensus, but instead its members were transformed into political prisoners of an
artificial prosperity. As a result, ‘conflicts were abolished’ as Tasos Trixopoulos, an
owner of 5 ha in Kotsari, stated. Group politics were forgotten, suppressed or wished
away. ‘We had in our mind only football and profitable hard work, while before
1967 everybody was involved in politics’ as Kostas Zervas, an owner of 25 ha in
Kotsari, explained.
Such enforced depoliticization reflected a new deal to replace the old personalized
partisanship of the past and transcended all social, political and economic
boundaries where different groups had previously been framed, and consequently
prospered, suffered or starved. The military regime made a plea to the individual
entrepreneur, or gave a command to the leading non-conformist that no political
dissent would be tolerated. As Aris Skarlos, Kotsari’s ex-village president of left-
wing persuasion explains, ‘the totalitarian regime attacked only the left wing MPs,
affecting the heads of the villages and the party leaders’. To this extent, the Colonels
left the silent masses undisturbed, allowing them to go about their lives as long as
they behaved properly as ‘real’ or ‘supposed’ supporters of the regime. Political
divisions were muted during the Dictatorship, while the army jointly with the police
were the powers responsible for reducing a patriarch’s disposition to segmented
dissent. Old scores among patriarchs now would only be settled by way of gossip or a
word in the ear of the authorities.
5.2. Cheap credit
By the end of the 1960s, the Colonels as ‘authority’ of their subjects were able to
project themselves as the ‘saviours of the countryside’ by providing the rural and
peripheral locality with a new bond to the state. This bond was a generous credit
institution alongside the other negative precedents of conscription and requisition.
‘During the Dictatorship one could go directly to the Bank, there were no mediators
anymore’ (Minas Rounis, owner of 5 ha and Kotsari’s co-operative president. The
parochial identity based on local patriarchal bosses was commensurately under-
mined. It was, in short, a time of entrepreneurial opportunities and the effects were
therefore distributed differentially. ‘Not all the peasants had the sense or wits to
understand that if they raised big loans, they could then buy land, even when the
Colonels said ‘‘rural people open your eyes, this is a time for asking’’’ (Grigoris
Louloudis, president of Zobas’s co-operative during the Dictatorship). It was
impossible for them to predict that produce prices would triple in a few years time, as
Grigoris Louloudis contemplated, though this was not only because they were ‘slow
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on the uptake, or scared of debts’ as he reasoned. Whilst in earlier more traditional
times, a peasant’s needs were satisfied within the extended patriarchal family and the
peripheral village both being largely independent of the urban reality, now the same
needs prompted people to also turn to the richer external resources of an aspatial
modernity. These however could be secured only by individual means and
differentiated adherence to norms. The entrepreneurial drive to compete, succeed,
become well-to-do and any number of other self-gratifying acts were locally fused,
occurring when villagers were subjected to the artificial eradication of segmented
dissensus and the magnetic stimulation of a booming market. As Gerasimos
Ramalidis, owner of 10 ha in Zobas and of left-wing persuasion, explains:
‘In 1972, I bought 11.2 ha of land with my brother. I never thought about putting profits
first but I had a goal. I raised this loan, because I felt sore about being unable to open a
water drilling in my fields, which were very parcelled-out with the biggest whole piece
being 0.1 ha. I was not eligible to apply for such a loan because I did not meet the
prerequisite minimum land ownership of 0.3 ha. Other villagers owned 0.5 ha and could
get a loan to open a drilling. If I remained idle, I would remain left behind, and I would not
be able to earn my living’
The Dictatorship period entered the peasants’ lives like a cloud. Suddenly, it was
‘raining cheap money and hardware’ and villagers had to manipulate these political
circumstances to their own benefit. It was the Dictatorship period that initially
promoted the capitalization of agriculture. ‘This cheap credit kept peasants’ children
at home, prevented migration, and gave a poor villager the chance to apply for a loan
without any long bureaucratic problems’ (Aris Skarlos, Kotsari’s ex-village president
and owner of 5 ha). These social and economic functions began to dissemble from
the one all-embracing patriarchal structure and become institutionalized in their own
right. Periklis Gleoudis’ story of his claim to autonomy reflects this change:
‘My father-in-law and I worked together. There was a difference of twenty years in our
ages. In 1967 I told him that I would buy a tractor. There were only 5 tractors in the
whole village and these were used to plough other villagers’ fields. His answer was ‘‘I
will not help you but I will not hinder you either. Do it yourself’’. By working very hard on
other people’s fields during the summer and autumn, I managed to secure all the money
that I needed in order to pay back the whole amount when the first instalment was due’
(Periklis Gleoudis, owner of 10 ha in Zobas)
An entrepreneurial son could now dare to have a voice individually against, or
even in agreement with the patriarchal will. The patriarch himself was facing
constant surprises even in connection with the age-old wheat cultivation and
unprecedented yields: ‘My grandfather never saw so much wheat before in his life, he
did not know where all this production could be stored’ (Christos Katsaganis, owner
of 10 ha in Zobas).
The Greek Dictatorship thus signalled rural society’s transition from a hierarchy
of rank to one of individual entrepreneurial status. It started to be considered more
degrading ‘to work for someone else’ than to raise a loan. It was the totalitarian state
that gave rural entrepreneurs, for the first time, this new option for the improvement
of their personal status. An individual identity in its own right was created by the
military state, based on a separation of the local patriarchal power from its legitimate
right to exercise authority. An ‘individual activism’ emerged, stimulated not by
kinship, sentiment or an endangered minimum welfare, but by an economic interest
entangled with a rising income. Cynically, it was the arrival of the Dictatorship
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period that prohibited segmented or domain dissensus and offered a different
perspective.
‘During the Dictatorship, villagers understood that they had an individual voice, a sign of
personality, and could make a claim for whatever they needed. Villagers could go to the
Agricultural Bank and make claims on their own. The Bank could now offer funding
without the need for substantial collateral’ (Antonis Stasinopoulos, cotton trader and
owner of 20 ha in Kotsari)
The Dictatorship offered not only cheap credit to the peasants, but also showed
them that they could free themselves from their dependence on the local patriarchal
elite. For the first time, entrepreneurial sons could alter the local patriarchal power
structure and consequently participate in the struggle for power, via the economic
route of increasing their capital assets and land area and therefore improve upon
their fringe social position. ‘The Dictatorship enlightened us, so we straightened
ourselves up’ (Aristides Bitakos, cotton trader). The patriarchal dichotomies, which
in the past had been rooted in membership of the village community, were thus
gradually dissolved by economic change. Sons could take the lead, patriarchs could
step down, powerful clans could face setbacks because young male entrepreneurs
were provided with the opportunity to initiate their economic future, not by
attachment to the representatives of the status quo, but by individuated dissent,
personal achievement and occupational mobility. The credibility of the patriarch’s
authority began to fade, when his experience and time-honoured judgement was no
longer a valuable guide to the most appropriate action and thus entrepreneurial sons
started to challenge his word or bypass him.
‘In the period of the Dictatorship, the appropriate guidelines and necessary funding
were given by the Agricultural Bank and we managed to take the initiative, we got a grip
on our business. Before we were stuck in a rut. It gave the producers trust in their own
labour force, the help was not only financial. We raised loans and bought machinery. We
wrestled with the loaned capital that we took out, finally managing to improve our lives’
(Thomas Levantis, owner of 10 ha in Kotsari)
In any case, patriarchs failed to adjust to the conditions of this new reality with
clearer means-ends connections. This time, their mistakes could not occur out of
sight, concealed behind institutionalized collectivities, where the individual respon-
sibility was lost and leadership pretended to have an intrinsic unquestionable value.
For instance:
‘The appointed village president belonged to the old school. He was the last to buy a
tractor, because he believed that all the yards would eventually be full of obsolete ones
and their prices would fall so much that he could buy them for half of the price or even
for free. In the end he bought the most expensive tractor. I was nothing compared to him,
I had less land, my fields were not so fertile, but he did not deal with agriculture as an
entrepreneur, so he was left behind, because he did not dare to take risks. He was afraid of
debts’ (Kostas Karidis, owner of 8 ha in Zobas)
The politically moderate entrepreneurial son who had not suffered the seizures of
the civil war thus became an agent seeking economic success, by following a uniform
(with only moderate emphasis differences on procedural norms in raising loans – that
is domain dissensus) but also totalitarian state-driven process. During the
Dictatorship, the milieu of deference was corroded and ‘no backstairs influence
dependent upon political ideology was needed then in order to claim one’s rights’
(Minas Rounis, owner of 5 ha and Kotsari’s co-operative president). Entrepreneurial
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sons no longer had to wait and exercise a maximum patience as their ultimate ‘form
of despair’ in relation to powerful state officials. The more open availability of credit,
the buying and selling of merchandise on a large scale, secure tenure in now
redistributed land,6 and the newly found niches for social mobility empowered these
entrepreneurial sons and generated mobility.
‘If you applied for a loan on Saturday, you could receive money on Monday. Since the
days of the Dictatorship, villagers started to receive the income that they deserved. They
became their own bosses and masters of their assets, because they could now sell their
crops’ (Thanasis Karouzos, electrician and owner of 45 ha in Zobas)
As Yannopoulos points out (1972, 125), ‘the Greek peasant managed during this
period to secure for the first time a small share from the growth of the national
income’. Hard work, state credit and a new legitimacy played the key roles in
developing an individual entrepreneurial status for the villagers in the 1970s. As a
result, village notions of aspiration and esteem were fundamentally altered in this
rural and peripheral milieu. Entrepreneurial sons were now involved in a race of
individual destiny and judgement (threshold dissensus) linked to the reconfiguration
of the farmers’ national status rather than being simple members of their fathers’
inherited and shared yokel identity (segmented dissensus).
5.3. Privacy and competition
At another level, the acknowledgement of this individual entrepreneurial identity was
refracted as part of the village housing structure. Importance was attributed to
privacy by the villagers’ attempts to build fences and indoor toilets (with the latter
enforced by fines), while more accessible road communication to the outside of the
house, neighbourhood, and group increased solitary exchanges and deconstructed
the patriarchal power of ‘all-in-one group meetings’. More small private meetings
with one’s own peers started to take place with electrification changing the peripheral
village setting forever. As Zobas’ community secretary remembers : ‘On the 20th of
November 1968 electricity lines reached the village for the first time and these shops
bought freezers as well and started to sell frozen meat and fish’. The individual
entrepreneur’s ability to respond to opportunities without interference from others
was facilitated just as much by this new infrastructure as by the new cultural context
in which it had developed.
Even in leisure the changes took their toll, whilst the transformed way of village
entertainment in the 1970s confirms this process of rising entrepreneurial individ-
ualism. ‘In the pre-Dictatorship past we needed one pair of trousers per year, we had
no idea what was meant by entertainment, shops or good houses’ (Maria
Stafillogianis’ husband, owner of 7 ha in Zobas). Hardship was lessened but
consumption and pleasure were increasingly becoming the end result of individual
judgement and entrepreneurial choices. During the 1960s locals ‘still had the Sunday
walk, the weddings, the fiestas, the village fetes and the whole village went to football
matches, after the 1970s, things changed. We started going to the seaside with our
children in our new truck’ as Dimitra Loukopoulou, a young truck driver’s wife then
and current owner of 10.7 ha in Kotsari, recounted. The transition from a localized
clan participation in village amusement into personalized gratification beyond the
village was by then well underway. Entrepreneurial sons’ decision to choose a
particular line of entertainment and life style in general provided confirmation that
one’s culture comes into being only through deed and desire. Education, offered
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away from the peripheral village that was even deprived of secondary school
provision, was another avenue of escaping patriarchal will.
‘When a villager had a new tractor instead of a cart and could go to the town market for
shopping, his lifestyle became completely different. He could toddle over there or even
take his wife to buy her a Christmas coat. Before, he had only an oxen driven cart and
travelled short distances by overcrowded buses. I went to high school, because there was
a new trend that children should study in order to escape village misery’ (Andreas
Mauridis, Zobas’s private agronomist and owner of 15 ha)
This approach to education, consumerism and entertainment was thus directly
connected to the increased entrepreneurial opportunities and threshold dissensus
differences that the Dictatorship period conferred on the younger generations. As
long as productivity was kept low, the entrepreneurial son was not able to separate
himself from the patriarchal will in order to aggrandize himself. The duty to help was
part and parcel of being a member of the old patriarchal world.
‘My father had a land holding of 6 ha. If we divided this land by six, then our
productivity would be zero. Before the 1970s, all family members worked together in
order to earn their daily bread. There was nothing left for entertainment, clothing or
extravagant meals. When I did my military service in Cyprus in 1964–65, I sent money
home. I was not used to spending money, so I saved. I received letters saying that my
brother had trouble irrigating our land, because he could not afford the petrol, so I sent
back 1500 Drs. to help him buy enough fuel for the whole summer period. We were
deeply immersed in our village so we said ‘‘no’’ to opportunities that we came across in our
lifetime’ (Stavros Vasiloudis, carpenter and owner of 12 ha in Zobas)
During the Dictatorship, however, ‘working together in the form of extended
families’ (patriarch and co-habituating brothers) lost its previous vigour and raison
d’etre, so new kinds of partnerships began to develop among neighbours and in-laws.
Giannis Vardas offers an account of how his family partnership with his brothers-
in-law (jointly owns 37 ha and cultivates 50 ha in Kotsari) and not his own brother
began as a result of an effort to take advantage of their adjacent fields’ shared access
to irrigation, and why it was successfully maintained in an increasingly diverse and
mobile society: ‘This partnership helped us to buy our first tractor. . . when water
shortages arise, such a liability affects all partners equally. If we separate, then it will
harm one field and one partner only’. However, the new type of business venturing
carried very different exactions and expectations over partner competence and
collaboration, and an exposure to those who seemed to be under-skilled for certain
jobs. As George Ramalidis, an owner of 10 ha in Zobas points out: ‘The wives
created the trouble. They kept asking ‘‘Why do you work more than your partner
who happens to be your brother?’ Individuated dissent was thus spreading
everywhere. Cutting remarks and class antagonisms would boost entrepreneurial
competition even further in the future.
To summarize, the Colonels’ experiment exposed the younger generations to
the lessons of how to focus their individual entrepreneurial will for a ‘just’
purpose that went beyond their household and challenged the patriarchy as an
effective means of dealing with the market and state. With the intrusion of
totalitarian politics, clear means-ends and personal ambition drove entrepreneurial
sons to make their own plans for the first time and exercise judgement behind
closed doors and regardless of status and the patriarchal hierarchy. But such
‘knowledge is highly interdependent with resource availability’ in a limited
resource environment, as Kodithuwakku and Rosa (2002, 436) also argued. The
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research issue here is thus not whether all or most younger family members
became more alert to taking loans or buying machinery (seemingly natural for
both young males and females) but rather that many young males were enabled
for the first time to express this alertness in practice.
6. Discussing a ‘different’ model of institutional change
The oral history presented in this paper examined the role of entrepreneurial
individuals in shaping institutional change in Thessaly, rural Greece and in particular
the transition from farm families bound up in patriarchy to individualized family
farming. It denotes consensus and dissensus politics as the conditions that
respectively constrain or enable such institutional entrepreneurship, whilst a high
threshold dissensus is considered to be a prerequisite for judgemental gains
underpinning opportunity recognition. Whilst patriarchs previously responded to
conflicting societal demands by allowing discrete variation or exercising outright
power (a set of ‘must’ rules), their entrepreneurial sons were now enabled to pursue
their own individual interests despite the highly institutionalized setting that the
Colonels ordered at this time.
Paradoxically, the Colonels’ regime reduced uncertainty by creating expectations
in the behaviour of others and recognizable means-ends relationships, even though
these were often negatives such as totalitarian law enforcement. Their politics
allowed only threshold dissensus differences to surface, whilst it prohibited
segmented or domain dissensus that could overturn the totalitarian regime itself.
The Colonels’ breakdown of old hierarchies had freed entrepreneurial individuals
from patriarchal rule and their vigour sprang momentarily from an accessibility to
the state that was now taken away from the old patriarchs who no longer
monopolized finance, knowledge or location within supra-local networks. The
illegitimate totalitarian regime empowered entrepreneurial sons to exercise judge-
ment, legitimize matter-of-fact criticisms of patriarchy and unintentionally deviate
from its previously taken-for-granted rules that could no longer overpower ‘interest’
(Beckert 1999; Dorado 2005), as institutional theory asserts to be axiomatically true.
This was not a rebellion but a depoliticized movement. The theoretical implications
of this ‘different’ model of institutional change that saw entrepreneurs shaping even
family practices are now examined below.
Institutional theorists have debated on either how political dissensus, state
autonomy, clear means-ends relations (certainty) and high subgroup strength lead to
deinstitutionalization (Selznick 1957; Oliver 1992; Evans 1995; Leblebici et al. 1991;
Beckert 1999; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Gibson and Vermeulen
2003), or conversely, on how political consensus underpinned by organizational
myths, confusing institutional arrangements, external dependence and goal ambigu-
ity (uncertainty) lead to institutionalization, contagious diffusion and isomorphic
convergence (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In these
writings, it can be crudely presumed that fragmentation builds up institutional forces
of staged (incremental) change, whilst heterogeneity generates institutional continu-
ity at the organizational field-level. There is a thin line, however between
fragmentation and heterogeneity if different combinations of contestation and
consent to societal requirements as a result of changing power distributions are taken
into account. In these conditions (which are encountered in modern economies),
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entrepreneurship emerges as the capacity to exploit the creative friction when
multiple (fragmented or heterogeneous) orders of worth7 are in play (Stark 2009). In
other historically-specific instances, however, when entrepreneurial action influences
social institutions, it is argued here that there has been a higher order of worth
(societal-level forces) that causes discontinuity in some of its practices (of justifying
worth) as a result of threshold dissensus differences. By contrast, fragmentation
exhibits an association with segmented dissensus, whilst heterogeneity (that is, agree
to disagree) is closer to domain dissensus. To this extent, the evidence presented here
highlights the significance of politics in externally infusing higher order constraints
on people’s action (a set of ‘must not’ rules) and offers an alternative account of what
drives strategic agency to the existing institutional literature that has excessively
focused on spontaneous orders of worth, coordination and self-enforcement issues
(Hodgson 2006). In a context of external enforcement, such as this case study
represents, the nature of normative dissensus that instigates institutional entrepre-
neurship emerges as being a matter of degree (adherence intensity), not location
(connectivity radius).
Organizational research has recently focused on how multiple, competing logics
or rationalities have shaped practice diffusion not in a period effect mode (Thornton
and Ocasio 1999) but rather in location-effect terms such as the case of New York-
based performance vs. Boston-based trustee logics leading to variation in how
mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money manage-
ment firms (Lounsbury 2007); or in ‘value sphere’ terms such as that of Alberta
Museum staff’s interplay of cultural and economic rationalities resulting in a variable
response to the governmental efforts of introducing business planning and
performance measures into cultural organizations (Townley 2002). Viewed from
another angle, this literature suggests that dissensus over the location, value sphere
or timing of a particular practice underlies institutional variation. In Lounsbury’s
research on institutional logics (2007, 303), it is even admitted that no deinstitu-
tionalization took place and that ‘ironically, neither of these logics has led to an
‘‘autonomous’’ profession of money management as they have both led to
commodification of service’. What is missing from these accounts of institutional
change is paying attention to any signs of longitudinal differentiation in individual
judgement amidst chaos and order that lead to deinstitutionalization. This paper fills
that gap in the literature.
Following Oliver’s definition (1992, 564), deinstitutionalization is ‘the process
by which the legitimacy of an established or institutionalized practice erodes or
discontinues’ with the added remark that such a practice rarely seems to
disappear in its entirety and in the greater part, it just readjusts. The patriarchal
rule is conceived here as such an institutionalized practice infused with
hierarchical power dynamics, value-laden judgements, rituals, resource dependen-
cies and historical contingency. In this empirical study, early post-war patriarchal
rule emerges as being not goal-oriented (Levine 1980), but rather brokerage-based
– bridging disconnected segments, that is Burt’s well-known ‘structural holes’ and
placing oneself as an outsider in the rare cases of entrepreneurial pursuits (Burt
1992; Stark 2009; Vedres and Stark 2010). In this sense patriarchy’s governing
style is perceived to be near-consensual, risk averse and part of a system of
dispersed power, whilst threshold dissensus was introduced as an outcome of
totalitarian politics and its aversion towards multiple orders of worth. Drawing
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upon this study’s findings, different institutional logics8 are seen to challenge one
another and most importantly erode when they are used by the same individuals
who increasingly choose or ‘make a case for’ loyalty to x over y frame of action
and not when used in parallel by dissenting social groups (Thornton and Ocasio
1999) or in heterogeneous domains (Friedland and Alford 1991). Institutional
change literature has rarely made this important distinction.
We are also informed that efficiency solutions infused with value, or in other
words institutions, cannot change without the enabling condition of internal
contradiction (Sewell 1992; Clemens and Cook 1999) that leads endogenously to
variation; or that of actors’ peripheral social position (Leblebici et al. 1991; Dorado
2005; Battilana 2006) that leads to deinstitutionalization by facilitating alternative
selection perceptions engrossed in opportunity recognition. ‘Technology is said to be
the source of variation’ (Leblebici et al. 1991, 335) in the first enabling condition of
institutional change, whilst institutional entrepreneurship fits better into the second
condition and is seen here as result of a certainty intractably connected to politics,
institutional discontinuity and new external dependencies (Figure 1). In this paper’s
line of analysis, central or peripheral social position is conceptualised in dissensus
terms – (as disagreement about what is considered to be ‘right’). What if one then
assumes that it is institutional selection associated with an injection of certainty
(Hannan and Freeman 1984) instead of variation, even an anomalous one
(Lounsbury and Crumley 2007) that leads in practice to deinstitutionalization?
What are the origins and structuring of such certainty? The answer given here is
‘subjective certainty’ that is dependent on the politics of a decision-making involving
multiple actors positions with inconsistent preferences and most importantly,
dissenting opinions – an index of normative dissensus conditions (Figure 1).
More specifically, the empirical enquiry pursued here has shown the nature of
normative dissensus that might facilitate or hinder the deinstitutionalization of
historically-entrenched patriarchal practices, using as a geographical focus rural
Greece – part of the Southern European periphery. Furthermore, it is argued here
that social (e.g. changing societal values) and functional pressures (e.g. changing
utilities) only aided rather than triggered such deinstitutionalization. It was political
pressures (e.g. changing external dependencies) that transformed the peripheral
social position of male offspring (in terms of their diminishing adherence to
prevailing norms and improved but also now neutralized access to state funds) and
thus enabled their differing entrepreneurial judgement on intra-family farm interests
and resources to alter practice selection patterns and thus erode the patriarchal rule.
These findings answer earlier criticisms regarding institutional explanations’ disre-
gard of political processes (Oliver 1992) and offer an insight on the antecedents of
deinstitutionalization.
6.1. In Conclusion
The evidence presented here suggests that institutional entrepreneurs in the case
study area (Thessaly, rural Greece) were not found to be disembedded from the
institutional arrangements and rules of early post-war Greek family farming (1949–
1966). However, it is the impact of the farm family cycle that was unexpectedly
minimized by its adult male offspring enterprising in the following period (1967–
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1974) that was characterized by the Colonels’ coup and ascendance to power.
The focus of such totalitarian politics expediently narrowed from emphasizing
patron-client relationships and various cooperative (or antagonistic) links between
farm families and their representatives (patriarchs) to concentrating uniformly on
relationships within individual family farms that could also be easily controlled. In
this political context, entrepreneurial sons were seen to mobilize the Colonels’ higher
order of worth and its accompanying farm modernization principles along with
ample credit that were exogenous to these actors and at the same time, were
unintentionally used by them to change the patriarchal rule. These entrepreneurial
sons used the causal powers of the totalitarian structures, centralization and
financing to empower their differing individual judgement and remove their farm
families from the sole control of their eldest male members and in this paradoxical
manner, they eroded patriarchy.
This paper uses institutional theory conceptualization to explain the modalities of
entrepreneurship, goal-oriented agency and strategic choice that led to the
deinstitutionalization of patriarchal rule. It is a narrative on the impact of a recent
totalitarian regime’s politics and its agricultural policies on the formation and
perpetuation of error-making in patriarchal practices, coordination and routine
knowledge that led to the shake up of the social institution itself. It was
entrepreneurial inadequacies intertwined with judgemental losses that marked the
local patriarch’s fallibility as an institutional agent under the new circumstances that
reduced peripherality, improved communication to the controlling centre of the
economy and prohibited both segmented and domain dissensus. Was it meant then
to be this way by any of the macro- or micro-actors involved in the making of
patriarchal rule atrophy? As Lawrence and Phillips argue (2004, 705), institutional
entrepreneurship has mostly been presented in the literature as being intentional, or
in other words ‘as an alternative to the deterministic images of isomorphism where
organizations reactively adopt practices and structures because of a desire to avoid
uncertainty, sanction or a loss of legitimacy’. However, this study has shown how
institutional entrepreneurs were elevated by normative threshold disagreement over
the ‘right’ use of totalitarian state-driven credit availability to unconsciously
question the patriarchal rule that was previously determining their shared under-
standing and behaviour (see Figure 1).
As Swedberg (2005) discusses, the concept of interest is typically associated with
utility in economics, whilst in sociology it is equated with valuation and judgement.
In the same fashion ‘orthodox economic theory postulates that profit is the main
motivational factor of entrepreneurs’ (Zafirovski 1999, 332) and thus entrepreneurial
action and interest are regarded as innate, individual and anti-social with institutions
becoming their joint outcomes. By contrast, sociologists have effectively counter-
argued that entrepreneurship is socially-conditioned with institutions being por-
trayed as pre-existing constraints of entrepreneurial behaviour (Zafirovski 1999),
Accordingly, sociologists saw entrepreneurship as being the dependent variable and
implicitly unable to impact institutions, whilst social context considerations
determine its variance. As part of the latter tradition, this study’s contribution lies
in its illustration of how the nature of dissensus on the value of an activity can
potentially enable entrepreneurship to become the mediating but also independent
variable for a specific period of time and thus erode a social institution such as
patriarchy. Lack of endurance, however, is the ultimate paradox of such
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entrepreneurial existence – its strategic choices bring about institutional change.
Institutional entrepreneurship is not a lifelong state of strategic agency.
Notes
1. According to Casson (1982, 24), judgemental decisions are instances where ‘different
individuals, sharing the same objective, and acting under similar circumstances would act
differently on account of different access to information or different interpretation of it’.
2. Four property groups were identified: upper range-sized landholdings (20–120 ha), middle
range landholdings (8–19 ha), lower middle range landholdings (4–7 ha) and small
landholdings (1–3 ha).
3. All real names were replaced with fictional, ghost names, for reasons of anonymity/
confidentiality.
4. Term first used by Sahlins (1972) to characterise economies organised by domestic groups
and kinship relations, in which production for use rather than exchange prevails and it is
directed towards the household’s internal requirements.
5. The Greek Communist Party was legalized by the Act of 23 September 1974.
6. Land redistribution occurred in Zobas in 1966 and in Kotsari in 1972 as the state response
to land fragmentation, a villager recalls: ‘before the land redistribution, I had 33 pieces in
Kotsari, and I had to keep notes so I won’t forget to sow some of them. Today I only have
one piece of land of 12.5 ha’.
7. As Stark (2009, 7) points out about the polysemic character of the term worth, ‘rather
than the static fixtures of value and values, it focuses instead on ongoing processes of
valuation’.
8. According to Leca and Naccache (2006, 632), ‘institutional logics are frameworks that
incorporate the assumptions, beliefs, and rules through which individuals organize time
and space, and which give meaning to their social reality’.
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